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A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY
Covert Deception, Strategic Fraud, 
and the Rule of Prohibited Intervention
GARY P. CORN Aegis Series Paper No. 2005
All warfare is based on deception.1
It clearly follows from the liberty and independence of Nations that each has the right to 
govern itself as it thinks proper, and that no one of them has the least right to interfere in the 
government of another.2
If information is power, then the corruption of information is the erosion, if not the 
outright usurpation, of power. This is especially true in the information age, where 
developments in the technological structure and global interconnectedness of information 
and telecommunications infrastructure have enabled states to engage in malicious influence 
campaigns at an unprecedented scope, scale, depth, and speed. The Digital Revolution and 
the attendant evolution of the global information environment have intensified, if not 
generated, what one expert describes as “one of the greatest vulnerabilities we as individuals 
and as a society must learn to deal with.”3 The relative explosion of digital information and 
communications technology (ICT) and the modern information environment it has enabled 
“have resulted in a qualitatively new landscape of influence operations, persuasion, and, 
more generally, mass manipulation.”4
As evidenced by Russia’s recent efforts at election interference in the United States and 
Europe, the role of information conflict in global strategic competition has evolved and 
taken on new weight.5 A number of revisionist states, Russia and China chief among them, 
have fully embraced the new reality of the modern information environment, deftly adapting 
their capabilities and strategies to exploit the societal vulnerabilities it exposes. They have 
incorporated sustained, hostile influence campaigns as a central part of their destabilizing 
strategies to cause or exacerbate societal divisions, disrupt political processes, weaken 
democratic institutions, and fracture alliances, all with a broader aim of undermining the 
rules-based international order and gaining competitive advantage.
The anchor for these campaigns is the extensive and deep use of ICTs to conduct covert 
deception and disinformation operations at an extraordinary scale. Deployed at a strategic 
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department 
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level, malign influence and disinformation operations have the very real potential to 
undermine and disrupt a targeted state’s independent exercise of core governance prerogatives. 
Along with the advent of hostile cyber operations, these ICT-enhanced deception campaigns 
have raised challenging questions about whether and how international law applies to these 
novel state interactions. This paper focuses on the customary international-law prohibition 
against intervening in the internal and external affairs of another state—a rule intended to 
protect the cardinal right of states to conduct their affairs without outside interference. It 
considers the rule’s applicability to the murky and evolving landscape of information conflict. 
Drawing on general principles of law, it argues for an interpretation of the nonintervention 
rule better suited to the realities of the information age, where undermining the exercise 
of sovereign free will is the specific aim of strategic covert deception and disinformation 
campaigns.
The nonintervention rule is important because US adversaries see the information 
environment as fertile ground for subverting the United States and the rules-based 
international order. Among the reasons for this perspective is the tremendous ambiguity 
surrounding the international legal framework applicable to states’ use of ICTs, especially in 
the gray zone below traditionally recognized use-of-force thresholds and outside of armed 
conflict. To date, efforts to achieve greater clarity regarding international law’s applicability 
to states’ use of ICTs, whether led by states or otherwise, have focused almost exclusively 
on the problem of harmful cyber-effects operations—the use of cyber capabilities to 
disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or manipulate computers or information systems or the data 
resident thereon. With the exception of some limited scholarship and commentary on the 
international-law implications of Russia’s 2016 election interference, little work has been 
done to analyze the use of ICTs as a platform for covert deception.
The primary conflict-regulation mechanism in international law is the United Nations 
(UN) Charter prohibition on states using force against the political independence or 
territorial integrity of other states. While a small number of states have recently signaled a 
willingness to consider some cyber operations involving serious financial or economic harm 
as amounting to uses of force, they have thus far not indicated the same openness with 
regard to influence operations. For good reason, they are unlikely to do so. Overly expansive 
invocation of the use-of-force prohibition has obvious escalatory implications. In contrast, 
the nonintervention rule, which governs both forcible and nonforcible measures, is far more 
suited to regulating the sub-use-of-force threats the nuanced sphere of information conflict 
and covert deception pose.
With respect to cyber-effects operations, there is little if any dissent from the view that 
the rule of prohibited intervention applies to states’ use of ICTs.6 Consensus quickly breaks 
down, however, over the rule’s content. The rule is generally described as prohibiting 
coercive measures against a limited but important zone of sovereign interests falling 
within what is commonly referred to as a state’s domaine réservé. Unfortunately, substantial 
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definitional and conceptual uncertainty clouds understandings of the “elements” of this rule 
and how they apply in practice, especially in the context of cyber and information conflict. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has described the element of coercion as “defin[ing], 
and indeed form[ing] the very essence of, prohibited intervention.”7 Many commentators 
have treated this statement as canonical and have applied it dogmatically, notwithstanding 
the court’s failure to offer a definition of the term. Both the ICJ’s statement and the undue 
weight many afford it misapprehend the true objective of the rule—to prevent states from 
employing measures aimed at depriving a targeted state of the free exercise of its will over 
protected sovereign matters. They also fail to capture significant modes of state action, 
strategic covert deception in particular, that should be considered internationally wrongful.
As the attorney general of the United Kingdom has noted, achieving greater clarity as to 
the nonintervention rule’s force and effect is of “particular importance in modern times 
when technology has an increasing role to play in every facet of our lives, including political 
campaigns and the conduct of elections.”8 Adapting the concept of coercion to account for 
the realities of modern information conflict is a necessary step toward achieving the clarity 
he seeks. Deception is frequently regulated in domestic legal regimes, either directly in the 
form of criminal fraud provisions, or indirectly through the recognition that deception can 
substitute constructively for the actual force and coercion elements of other crimes. In both 
cases, it is the subversion of free will that is considered the cognizable harm. States should 
draw on these general principles of law to inform the concept of coercion in international law 
and thereby better define the nonintervention rule’s applicability to information conflict.
This paper’s efforts to reinforce the existing international legal architecture are not offered 
as a panacea to the ill of foreign influence campaigns. International law has its limits, 
and countering hostile foreign influence will require a far more holistic and concerted 
approach than simply evolving or achieving greater clarity as to the scope of applicability 
of any particular rule of international law. But as one important study notes, the United 
States “needs an updated framework for organizing its thinking about the manipulation 
of infospheres by foreign powers determined to gain competitive advantage.”9 The 
US Department of Defense’s implementation of a new cyber strategy in 2018 with its 
operational concept of “defend forward” is a step in the right direction, as evidenced 
by the success of US Cyber Command’s reported operations to counter Russian election 
interference in 2018. Accurately characterizing covert influence campaigns as a matter of 
international law would add additional tools to the defend-forward toolbox, and doing so 
should figure prominently in a broader effort to develop a coherent strategy and framework 
to counter foreign influence efforts while reinforcing the rules-based international order.
The Problem: Covert Deception and Disinformation Operations at Scale
Information conflict is not new. Propaganda is a truly ancient human endeavor, and states 
have leveraged information—truthful, manipulated, and fabricated—for influence purposes 
since the inception of the Westphalian order. Hostile influence campaigns have historically 
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assumed many monikers and taken many forms but generally share the common 
characteristic of disseminating overt and covert propaganda (including facts, opinions, 
rumors, half-truths, and lies) in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. 
Suasion, including the use of propaganda, is a staple of statecraft and has long been viewed 
as falling outside international law’s reach.
The Cold War provides a relatively recent example. Political warfare was the defining 
characteristic of the conflict, and a primary weapon in the Soviet Union’s arsenal was 
its use of “active measures”—subversive practices including political influence efforts, 
the surreptitious use of Soviet front groups and foreign communist parties, and the core 
element of dezinformatsiya (disinformation).10 One former KGB general described the use 
of active measures as “the heart and soul of the Soviet intelligence” apparatus, specifically 
designed to subvert the United States and “drive wedges” in the West’s alliances.11 To 
be sure, the United States also employed deception during the Cold War. But Russia has 
reinvigorated such efforts in the post–Cold War era; according to recent US intelligence 
assessments, Russia’s campaign to interfere in the 2016 presidential election “demonstrated a 
significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort” to undermine “the 
U.S.-led democratic order.”12
Russia’s efforts in 2016 were aimed directly at the US presidential election. The objective 
was to undermine public faith in the democratic process and to denigrate and harm the 
electability of one candidate and boost the candidacy of another. Although unprecedented 
in scope and scale, Russia’s campaign “followed a longstanding . . .  messaging strategy 
that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by 
Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid 
social media users or ‘trolls.’ ”13 Russia employed a multifaceted approach to its interference 
campaign that involved cyber espionage against both political parties; the weaponization 
of sensitive information collected through those operations, specifically the timed release 
through intermediaries of personal emails and other damaging information belonging to 
Democratic Party officials and political figures; hacking into state and local electoral boards 
and voting systems; and a deep and extensive propaganda effort, both overt and covert.14
Russia’s use of “quasi-government trolls” to covertly propagandize and spread mis- and 
disinformation played a central role in its election interference efforts and demonstrated 
Russia’s broader goals of undermining public faith in the democratic process and 
institutions and generally seeding and cultivating political discord. The Internet Research 
Agency (IRA), an entity in St. Petersburg, Russia, financed by a Russian oligarch and close 
Vladimir Putin ally with ties to Russian intelligence, ran an extensive and well-organized 
social-media dezinformatsiya campaign.15 Among other tactics, the IRA used false personas 
and the stolen identities of real Americans to purchase millions of dollars’ worth of 
advertising on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram to plant 
propaganda, and used false accounts and bots to amplify its messaging. The IRA also used 
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these false social media accounts to stage political rallies in the United States and to solicit 
and pay unwitting US persons to promote or disparage candidates.
Based on these well-documented interference efforts, in 2018 the grand jury in Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation returned an indictment of thirteen Russian 
individuals and three companies associated with the covert deception campaign.16 
Each was accused, inter alia, of conspiring “to defraud the United States by impairing, 
obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the government through fraud 
and deceit for the purposes of interfering with the U.S. political and electoral process, 
including the presidential election of 2016.”17 The indictment lays out in detail the IRA’s, 
and by extension Russia’s, extensive covert influence activities aimed at swaying the 2016 
election and “sow[ing] discord in the U.S. political system.”18 In 2020, the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence released an extensive three-volume report, Russian Active 
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, confirming the intelligence 
community’s assessment.19
Russia’s interference and covert influence campaigns are not limited to targeting the 
United States. Europe has been on the receiving end of Russia’s disruptive efforts perhaps 
longer than has the United States.20 In addition to targeting an array of European states 
with destabilizing disinformation campaigns generally, Russia has targeted elections in 
Ukraine, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to name a few, as well as the European 
Parliament election in 2019.
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election served as a wake-up call. In response, 
the United States mounted a concerted, government-wide effort to protect the 2018 midterm 
elections against Russian interference operations, taking measures that reportedly included 
Department of Defense cyber operations. But Russia’s covert influence operations have not  
abated. All indicators point to Russia stepping up its efforts to interfere in the 2020 elections.21 
Evidence is also mounting that Russia is disseminating disinformation regarding the 
COVID-19 pandemic in order “to aggravate the public health crisis in Western countries, 
specifically by undermining public trust in national healthcare systems—thus preventing 
an effective response to the outbreak.”22
Russia is not alone in this regard. Although arguably several steps behind, China has 
also moved aggressively into the information conflict arena. The Chinese Communist 
Party “has used ideology and propaganda as governing tools ‘since the People’s Republic 
was established in 1949,’ and this can even be dated to the Party’s founding in 1921.”23 
While traditionally these efforts were more internally focused, China now views influence 
and information operations as a “magic weapon” for achieving its foreign policy goals.24 
Indications are that it has learned from Russia’s disinformation campaigns. China is testing 
those lessons and refining its influence capabilities in Taiwan and Southeast Asia and has 
moved beyond spreading, for example, COVID-19−related disinformation.25
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Russia and China present the most advanced information-conflict threats, but they are not 
the only threats. Iran and other US adversaries are studying, emulating, and adapting the 
Russian and Chinese models to advance their own disruptive goals. According to the  
2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment, “US adversaries and strategic competitors almost 
certainly will use online influence operations to try to weaken democratic institutions, 
undermine US alliances and partnerships, and shape policy outcomes in the United States 
and elsewhere.”26 In each case, these campaigns extend beyond open influence activities, 
employing sophisticated deception operations to achieve strategic aims. Countering these 
efforts is and should be a stated US policy goal, along with strengthening the international 
rules-based order and the applicability of international law to states’ use of ICTs, other 
emerging technologies, and interactions in the information environment.27 The rule of 
prohibited intervention is the most pertinent rule of international law available to confront 
the harm of election interference and covert deception campaigns.
International Law and the Principle of Nonintervention
State sovereignty and the principle of sovereign equality form the foundation upon which 
the rules-based international order rests.28 At its core, sovereignty signifies independence in 
relations between states, with independence being the right to exercise the functions of a state 
within a defined portion of the globe—the territory under the state’s lawful jurisdiction—to 
the exclusion of any other state.29 These organizing principles underlie the most important 
rules of international law governing interstate relations, such as the jus ad bellum prohibition 
on states using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states.30
States have also developed the customary international-law principle of nonintervention 
as a safeguard against impairments of their sovereignty. The principle is considered 
a “corollary of every state’s right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence.”31 It protects the “right of every sovereign State to conduct its [internal and 
external] affairs without outside interference.”32 The nonintervention principle is written 
into numerous international instruments, and states frequently invoke it, albeit with 
imprecision and under disparate circumstances.
The customary status of the nonintervention rule is not controversial, and the proposition 
that it applies to states’ use of ICTs, at least in the context of cyber operations, is gaining 
increased acceptance among states.33 Further, it is widely recognized that the rule can be 
violated by both forcible and nonforcible means.34 Unfortunately, outside of relatively clear 
examples of forcible interventions—which concurrently violate the prohibition on the use 
of force—the rule’s content is commonly recognized as ill defined.35 This makes it difficult 
to discern the line between nonforcible but unlawful interventions on the one hand and 
lawful influence activities on the other.
States routinely employ various means of statecraft with the intent of shaping other states’ 
policy decisions or actions, and there is no general prohibition in international law against 
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states engaging in suasion. And although states frequently invoke the terms intervention 
and interference to complain about such activities, they are not the same normatively. 
International law only proscribes the former as wrongful; “interference pure and simple is 
not intervention.”36 It is an important distinction, setting apart what states view as legitimate 
from illegitimate forms of statecraft, itself an expression of sovereign will. Unfortunately, 
the indeterminate line between mere interference and prohibited intervention weakens the 
nonintervention rule’s value as a guard against impairments of sovereign rights and “risks 
permitting coercive policies that undermine the political independence of states or impair 
the right to self-determination,” especially in the context of information conflict.37
Although the precise content and scope of the nonintervention principle are unclear, 
certain core aspects of the rule are evident. The general contours can be gleaned from the 
ICJ’s description of the principle in its Nicaragua judgment, where it explained:
The principle [of nonintervention] forbids all States or groups of States to intervene 
directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited 
intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, 
by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a 
political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. 
Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, 
which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed 
forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of 
an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the 
indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.38
This passage is often cited for the proposition that interference is only internationally wrongful 
when two constituent elements are present. First, the measures employed must be directed 
against the domaine réservé of the targeted state. Second, such measures must be coercive.39
The ambiguity that plagues the nonintervention rule generally also infects these two 
elements. Unfortunately, the ICJ has offered little by way of additional explanation. This 
should not be surprising. The court’s discussion of nonintervention in the Nicaragua 
judgment was narrowly confined to the specific facts of the case, which primarily concerned 
forcible measures.40 Further, the court’s entire sua sponte discussion of the nonintervention 
principle was only for the purpose of ruling out whether the forcible measures attributed to 
the United States were justified as countermeasures.41 As such, its broader pronouncements 
on the elements of the rule—or lack thereof—were unnecessary and should be considered 
with circumspection.42 Still, convention holds that the concept of coercion demarcates the 
line between mere interference and wrongful intervention.43
The ICJ’s focus on coercion as the touchstone of prohibited intervention likely reflects 
the evolution of the rule over time from one that traditionally served to protect only the 
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territorial integrity of states against military force to one aimed at also shielding political 
independence against nonforcible infringements.44 In this regard, the term is perhaps 
equally inapt and unhelpful since in common parlance the concept of coercion is generally 
considered to involve force or the threat of force to impose one’s will on another.45 As set 
out below, overreliance on coercion as a defining element of intervention distorts the focus 
of the rule and risks excluding from its scope nonforcible means of subverting protected 
sovereign interests. Before turning to the element of coercion, however, a brief discussion of 
the concept of domaine réservé is useful.
The Concept of Domaine Réservé
As noted, the nonintervention rule does not reach all forms of state interference in the 
internal affairs of other states. It is a rule of finite scope as to both the object and means 
of outside state action. And states have generally rejected proposals to prohibit their use of 
propaganda to influence other states. With respect to the object of prohibited intervention, 
the zone of sovereign interests or state functions protected by the rule has never been well 
understood or defined.
Oppenheim describes intervention generally as “a form of interference by one state in the 
affairs, internal or external, of another” by either direct or indirect means.46 By “affairs,” 
Oppenheim is referring loosely to the prohibited object of intervention—matters which, 
as a function of sovereignty, are reserved in international law to the sole prerogative of 
states. This zone of protected interests is often referred to, imprecisely, as the state’s domaine 
réservé. As Jens David Ohlin has noted, “despite the patina of precision in its French 
rendering, the concept has little internally generated content” as a concept.47
Strictly speaking, domaine réservé refers only to matters within a state’s internal jurisdiction, 
and therefore does not speak to the full range of protected sovereign functions which 
also include a state’s external affairs.48 According to the ICJ, these matters include, but are 
not limited to, the right to choose a political, economic, social, and cultural system and 
to formulate and execute foreign policy.49 The right of states to independence over these 
matters is not conferred by international law, but rather is inherent in the concepts of 
statehood and sovereignty. Therefore, the rule’s protection is better understood as extending 
to those matters in which each state has the right, “by the principle of State sovereignty, to 
decide freely.”50 Restrictions on states’ independence over these sovereign matters cannot be 
presumed.51
Perhaps the most frequently cited example of a matter falling within the scope of the 
domaine réservé, and thus within the nonintervention rule’s protection, is a state’s choice of 
both its political system and its organization.52 In contrast, purely commercial government 
activities are generally considered to fall outside of the domaine réservé.53 Between these 
extremes, uncertainty lingers, and the rule’s scope depends on a number of variables, 
including, perhaps most importantly, the degree to which a particular state’s discretion 
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over a matter is subject to its specific international obligations. To the extent a state’s policy 
choices are governed by international law, the state is considered to have surrendered its 
discretion over the matter. That is, the concept of sovereign prerogative is not without 
limits, and those “domains or activities” not strictly reserved to the state are said to be 
potentially subject to foreign action.54 Accordingly, in light of the ever-expanding subjects 
of international regulation, some commentators argue that the concept of domaine réservé is 
diminishing, and therefore so too is the utility of the nonintervention rule.
These are exaggerated claims. First, since international legal obligations vary from state to 
state, the “margin of liberty” each exercises will differ accordingly.55 International legal 
obligations differ widely as to content and may apply differently depending on the state 
involved and the given circumstances. Further, states often retain significant independent 
authority even with respect to matters committed to international law.56 The scope of 
another state’s authority to intervene in a matter regulated by international law will generally 
be defined by the source of the obligation at issue. Most often, available remedies are narrow 
and specifically defined in applicable treaties. Outside of such treaty-based measures, the 
customary law of state responsibility sets a high bar for an intervening state to claim that 
the wrongfulness of its employment of coercion against a targeted state should be excused 
or precluded as a legitimate countermeasure.57 Therefore, the fact that a matter is in some 
way the subject of international regulation does not equate to a license for other states to 
coerce decisions or conduct with respect thereto.
Ultimately, like many aspects of international law, whether a matter falls within the 
protective ambit of the nonintervention rule involves a fact-specific inquiry, considering 
state practice and opinio juris prevalent at the time.58 Suffice to say that, notwithstanding 
the increasing degree to which states surrender some degree of sovereignty to international 
regulation, there exists a strong presumption that matters of state governance fall to the 
sole prerogative of states and are protected from external intervention. That is, “it is in the 
expression of [the] idea” that sovereignty equates to “the exclusion of the authority of other 
states, but not international law,” that “the principle of nonintervention has its primary 
function.”59 Holding elections and implementing public-health measures, two areas that 
Russia has specifically targeted in the last several years, certainly fall within this protective 
umbrella. Elections are frequently cited as a quintessential matter falling within a state’s 
domaine réservé.60 Similarly, the adoption and implementation of public-health policies and 
measures, especially in the face of a global pandemic, are widely recognized as legitimate 
matters of governance within a state’s internal sovereign jurisdiction.61
The Elusive Element of Coercion
As with the concept of domaine réservé, little interpretive guidance exists in international 
law regarding the element of coercion. In Nicaragua, the ICJ described as a particularly obvious 
case “an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in 
the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another 
10
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State.”62 Equally obvious is that neither propaganda nor aggressive diplomacy qualifies as 
a prohibited intervention, at least not per se.63 Between these extremes, the standard lacks 
clarity, making it difficult to map to the realm of information conflict.
The principle of nonintervention has been described as a “doctrinal mechanism to 
express the outer limits of permissible influence that one state may properly exert upon 
another.”64 Since the principle’s inception, locating the demarcation between permissible 
and impermissible influence has proved exceedingly difficult. The vagueness in the rule’s 
scope and meaning traces back to the principle’s conceptual roots and the differences in 
the early naturalist and positivist approaches to international law generally, and to the 
principle’s definition and evolution specifically—differences beyond the scope of this 
paper.65 It is enough to note that a significant aspect of these early debates centered on 
whether the principle was absolute or was subject to exception, for example, as a matter of 
self-preservation.66 The latter view ultimately held sway, shifting the focus of the debate 
to the issue of when interventions might be justified, and, more important to the present 
discussion, how to define the “outer limits” of permissible influence.
Historically, armed force, described as “dictatorial interference,” was considered the dividing 
line between permissible and impermissible influence.67 In fact, well into the twentieth 
century, many states and commentators, including the United States, held the view that 
prohibited intervention and the prohibition on the threat or use of force were equivalent.68 
Over time, however, the concept of intervention expanded, and coercion evolved as a 
broader but inapt benchmark for denominating the boundary between lawful influence and 
prohibited intervention.
Thus, according to Oppenheim, “to constitute intervention [an] interference must be 
forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive,” and can take the form of direct or indirect 
military action, as well as nonmilitary actions such as economic or political measures 
“where they have the necessary coercive effect.”69 This expanded concept of intervention 
also finds expression in a number of treaties, declarations, and General Assembly 
resolutions concluded in the latter half of the twentieth century—instruments that the 
ICJ has cited as reflective of customary international law.70 For example, the Friendly 
Relations Declaration recalls “the duty of States to refrain in their international relations 
from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political 
independence or territorial integrity of any State.”71 However, beyond reinforcing the 
notion that prohibited interventions can be effected by nonforcible means, these sources 
offer little guidance on the meaning of coercion as the term is used in the specific context 
of intervention, and in certain respects are at odds with state practice. States routinely use 
sanctions and other economic means to pressure or compel other states and have frequently 
rejected proposals that would deem the use of economic pressure as internationally 
wrongful.
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The ICJ’s rendering of the nonintervention principle in its Nicaragua judgment is often cited 
as offering a definitive description of the rule’s content. According to the court:
Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, 
which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed 
forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of 
an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the 
indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.72
However, as noted above, the court specifically limited the scope of its review, confining 
its description to “only those aspects of the principle which appear to be relevant to the 
resolution of the dispute.”73 By and large, the dispute was over measures the court separately 
determined to constitute direct and indirect uses of force that it deemed “particularly 
obvious” examples of intervention.74 Beyond this discussion, the court intimates that 
coercion can involve nonforcible measures, but offers no guidance on how.
Undue weight is often ascribed to the court’s discussion of the nonintervention rule. 
Its account of the rule is nonbinding and general in description.75 In this regard, its 
comment that coercion “defines” and “forms the very essence” of the rule is overbroad and 
misleading. As set out below, the essence of the nonintervention rule is the prevention of 
measures intended to subvert a state’s independence over protected sovereign prerogatives, 
or free will. The court’s reference to coercion is better understood as illustrative of the fact 
that not all modes of interference are internationally wrongful, and a loosely conceived 
concept of coercion specific to the nonintervention context has emerged over time as a 
reference point for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible influence.76
Defining a sensible limit to the principle’s reach is no doubt important; otherwise the 
rule risks sweeping within its ambit “any act which ha[s] an effect on another state.”77 
However, overinclusiveness is not currently the problem. As reflected in the ICJ’s emphasis 
in Nicaragua on the concept of coercion, the nonintervention rule is mired in the past 
and therefore tethered to force as the sine qua non of its violation. This raises legitimate 
questions as to the rule’s utility in light of the separate prohibition on the use of force. 
And while there is general agreement that the rule now comprehends nonforcible modes 
of coercion, what that means in practice remains clouded in uncertainty. Owing to the 
historical force-prohibition emphasis of the rule, efforts to elucidate the meaning of 
coercion frequently miss the mark on correlating this “element” to the underlying purpose 
of the nonintervention principle—to protect against the subversion of a targeted state’s 
independent sovereign choices—making underinclusiveness a far greater risk. This dynamic 
has become particularly evident in the context of information conflict.
Some also consider the Nicaragua judgment to imply that to constitute coercion, one 
state’s actions must involve an actual threat against the affected state, and the threatened 
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consequence of noncompliance must itself be unlawful.78 However, nothing in the 
judgment or international law more broadly requires that an intervention be effected by 
threat of consequence, lawful or otherwise. To the extent that a threat is involved, the 
threatened consequence must be judged contextually to determine whether it crosses the 
line between prohibited coercion and lawful, albeit “corrosive,” pressure.79 Furthermore, 
interpreting nonintervention as being premised on a compelled quid pro quo again 
misapprehends the interest protected by the rule—unimpeded sovereign prerogative and 
the right of independence in governance. As discussed further below, threats of negative 
consequence are not the only means for undermining this interest.
It is well recognized that the principle of nonintervention is an outgrowth, or corollary, of the 
principles of sovereignty and the sovereign equality of states. “Sovereignty in the relations 
between States signifies independence,”80 and independence has long been understood as 
“the power of giving effect to the decisions of a will which is free” from external restraint.81 
Where a state employs measures “calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences” 
on a targeted state that if successful would “in effect [deprive] the state intervened against 
of control over [a sovereign] matter,” the line between interference and intervention is 
implicated and likely crossed.82 Nonintervention is far more about potential consequence 
than it is about the means employed. While the choice of means is a relevant factor, as in the 
case of forcible measures that are presumptively employed to compel an outcome, it is not 
definitive. Thus, the rule is better understood as prohibiting measures calculated and likely 
to deprive, subordinate, or substantially impair the right of independence in governance, and 
such interventions are wrongful even if inchoate or unsuccessful.83
In her recent Chatham House paper on sovereignty and nonintervention, Harriet Moynihan 
reaches a similar conclusion. She describes coercion as the application of pressure or 
compulsion by one state sufficient to subordinate the sovereign will of the targeted 
state.84 Thus, in her view, “the non-intervention principle is in practice capable of broader 
application” than a narrow interpretation of the ICJ’s description of coercion would 
suggest.85 According to Moynihan:
Sources [suggest] that the coercive behaviour could extend beyond forcing a change of 
policy to other aims, such as preventing the target state from implementing a policy or 
restraining its ability to exercise its state powers in some way. At the same time, as noted 
above, the attempt to deprive the target state of its free will over its sovereign powers is 
carried out for the benefit of the perpetrating state in some way: the unauthorized exercise 
of authority is not incidental. The benefit sought need not relate to a specific policy issue; 
it may suffice for the target state’s control over the underlying policy area to be impaired 
in a way that adversely affects the target state. In light of this, the coercive behaviour is 
perhaps best described as pressure applied by one state to deprive the target state of its free 
will in relation to the exercise of its sovereign rights in an attempt to compel an outcome 
in, or conduct with respect to, a matter reserved to the target state.86
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This approach correctly places emphasis on the nonintervention rule’s central focus of 
protecting states’ independence over core sovereign prerogatives.87 Actions calculated to 
subvert a state’s free will undermine the sovereign equality of states and the international 
order, and present a direct threat to international stability, peace, and security.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 appears to take a similar approach. Rejecting the idea that coercion 
requires physical force, the manual states that coercion “refers to an affirmative act 
designed to deprive another State of its freedom of choice, that is, to force that State to act 
in an involuntary manner or involuntarily refrain from acting in a particular way.”88 Not 
surprisingly, Michael Schmitt, the general editor, also recognizes that the primary focus of 
the nonintervention rule and the “core” function of the element of coercion is to prevent 
subordination of sovereign free will. In his view, “a coercive action is intended to cause the 
State to do something, such as take a decision that it would otherwise not take, or not to 
engage in an activity in which it would otherwise engage.”89
The evolving realm and nature of information conflict is providing states with lucrative 
opportunities to undermine the sovereign decisions of adversaries, yet how the 
nonintervention principle applies to propaganda and influence campaigns remains unclear. 
Debates over whether Russia’s reported hack into the Democratic National Committee’s 
(DNC) servers and subsequent “meddling” in the 2016 presidential election constituted a 
prohibited intervention are a case in point. Some argue that, in the aggregate, Russia’s actions 
sufficiently manipulated the election process to qualify.90 Others view them as espionage and 
propaganda, which are not violations of international law by themselves, at least not per se.91
Some scholars and commentators considering the question of whether influence operations 
or propaganda alone can violate the rule have converged on the view that the use of covert 
deception crosses the intervention line, but little analysis is offered in support of this 
conclusion.92 For example, Schmitt suggests that Russia’s covert “troll” operation may have 
violated the nonintervention rule because “arguably, the covert nature of the troll operation 
deprived the American electorate of its freedom of choice” when exercising the franchise. 
But he does not elaborate on how this aligns with more rigid interpretations of coercion, 
such as those that would require an interaction premised on a threat of consequence.93
The answer is twofold. First, as set out above, the nonintervention rule has never been 
premised on the existence of a threat-based transaction. It is a rule meant to prevent states 
from engaging in measures calculated to subvert sovereign free will. Second, measures 
of deception are commonly recognized in domestic legal systems as cognizable harms 
precisely because they are a means of undermining the exercise of free will. States frequently 
regulate deception either directly in the form of fraud-based proscriptions, or indirectly by 
making deception a constructive substitute for force or coercion elements of other crimes. 
States can draw on these general principles to adapt the nonintervention rule to the 
realities of the modern information environment.
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General principles of law common to the principal legal systems of the world are 
recognized as valid subsidiary sources for determining the scope and meaning of primary 
treaty and customary international-law rules such as the rule of prohibited intervention.94 
Admittedly, the means of identifying general principles of law and the normative weight 
to be accorded them is an open question, and a fulsome review of states’ domestic legal 
regimes is beyond the scope of this paper.95 What follows are illustrative examples with 
an emphasis on US domestic law. Like all states, the United States can draw on these 
principles to inform its views on the meaning of coercion as applied in the context of the 
nonintervention rule and, by extension, the scope of application of the rule more generally.
Deception as a Means of Undermining Free Will
The indictment of the thirteen Russians and three Russian organizations stemming from 
the special counsel’s investigation into Russian election meddling in 2016 is a compelling 
exposition, albeit in the vernacular of US domestic law, of a prohibited intervention into 
the US electoral process. The indictment lays out in great detail Russia’s extensive covert 
deception campaign intended to impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful functions of the US 
government “for the purpose of interfering with the U.S. political and electoral processes.”96 
Significantly, the gravamen of the indictment was that the Russians carried out their 
scheme of interference by nonforcible means of fraud and deceit.
Specifically, the defendants were charged, inter alia, with conspiring to defraud the United 
States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 by impeding the lawful functions of the Federal 
Election Commission, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State to administer 
federal requirements for disclosure of foreign involvement in certain domestic activities.97 
Section 371, the general federal conspiracy statute, prohibits two or more persons from 
conspiring to obstruct or interfere with a legitimate government activity “by deceit, craft 
or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.”98 This portion of the statute is intended 
to “protect governmental functions from frustration and distortion through deceptive 
practices.”99 While cheating the government out of money or property can serve as one 
means by which someone can defraud the United States, prosecution under Section 371 is 
not limited to financial crimes.100 Actions “calculated to frustrate the functions of an entity 
of the United States will suffice.”101
The fraud provisions encompassed in Section 371 are not unique. They reflect long-
standing common-law fraud concepts that proscribe both pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
harm, including depriving victims of a legal right. Fraud is also criminalized at the  
state level throughout the United States, and similar concepts can be found in the legal 
systems of most, if not all, nations. Fraud is a crime of deceit that traces its roots in both 
common and civil law systems to the early Roman lex Cornelia de Falsis.102 Fraud and similar 
provisions recognize that deception can be both a means to a harmful end and a legally 
cognizable harm in and of itself.103 As such, legal systems universally regulate deception 
directly by criminalizing fraud and other crimen falsi. Fraud and similar provisions are 
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ultimately grounded in the recognition that at its core, deception is a nonforcible means of 
undermining free will.
In addition to proscribing crimen falsi, legal systems commonly regulate deception 
indirectly as well, prescribing it as a constructive substitute for elements of actual force and 
coercion in other crimes. This legal principle has deep historical roots. For example, the 
common law has long recognized that for the crime of burglary, the element of breaking can 
be effected not just by actual force, but also constructively through deceit.104 Constructive 
force is recognized in other areas of law as well: deception can substitute for force as the 
actus reus of larceny. Larceny by trick is a species of larceny dating back at least to 1779 in 
English common law,105 where the element of trick substitutes for the wrongful-taking 
element required by larceny.106 The rationale behind including larceny by trick within the 
crime of larceny is that “fraud vitiates the property owner’s consent to the taking.”107 As 
such, the common law developed so that, to satisfy the requirements for larceny, “actual 
trespass or actual violence is not necessary. Fraud may take the place of force.”108
Rape law offers another example of constructive force through deception. Although the 
traditional definition of rape required force or threat of force to satisfy the actus reus, the 
common law developed to embrace situations “in which the defendant employed deception 
rather than force.”109 Traditional common law distinctions between fraud in the factum and 
fraud in the inducement have steadily fallen away, with states trending toward adoption 
of the Model Penal Code approach, which states that consent is ineffective if “it is induced 
by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the 
offense.”110 Consistent with this trend, states have allowed specific instances of fraud in the 
inducement to serve as the basis for a rape conviction, including fraud in the context of 
certain professional relationships, spousal impersonation, impersonation of another, fraud 
as to the nature of the act, and “a few newer provisions more generally making consent 
obtained by fraud insufficient.”111 In each of these cases, the salient point is the recognition 
that deceit vitiates consent, the ultimate expression of free will.
Consider also the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA).112 Passed as part of the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, it was the first comprehensive 
federal law to address human trafficking. Recognizing that deception can “have the same 
purpose and effect” as actual threats of or use of physical coercion, Congress criminalized 
“severe forms” of human trafficking, which it defines as sex and labor trafficking induced 
by, inter alia, force, fraud, or coercion.113 As one court recognized, “the TVPA not only 
protects victims from the most heinous human trafficking crimes, but also various 
additional types of fraud and extortion leading to forced labor.”114
The idea that deception is a legally cognizable harm, in the form of fraud or as a 
constructive substitute for force or coercion, is not unique to United States law. These are 
precepts of law commonly reflected in domestic legal systems.115 Drawing on these precepts, 
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some states have also begun passing legislation specifically addressing foreign influence, 
disinformation, and election interference.116
Australia, for example, passed comprehensive legislation in 2018 in response to the 
growing threat of foreign interference. As part of this legislation, the National Security 
Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 amended Australia’s 
Criminal Code Act 1995 to create a slew of new criminal offenses related to national 
security, espionage, and foreign influence. The two most relevant offenses are general 
foreign interference and foreign interference involving a targeted person.117 For purposes 
of these new offenses, Australia distinguishes between foreign influence, which it deems 
permissible, and foreign interference, describing the latter as conduct that “goes beyond 
the routine diplomatic influence that is commonly practised by governments [and] . . .  
includes covert, deceptive and coercive activities intended to affect an Australian political or 
governmental process.”118 This distinction tracks closely with general understandings of the 
divide between lawful interference and prohibited intervention in international law, and 
specifically recognizes covert deception as a means of intervention.
Australia is not alone in its efforts to combat foreign interference and adapt its domestic 
legal structure to account for the evolving nature of information conflict. France and 
other countries have either adopted or are considering laws to protect against foreign 
interference, disinformation, and election meddling. Many of these approaches similarly 
recognize the significance and threat of covert deception. These concepts are often reflected 
in international instruments as well. For example, Congress’s approach to sex trafficking 
finds a direct analog in international law, which also recognizes that coercion need not be 
limited to physical force for purposes of human trafficking, defining trafficking to include 
inducement “by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, [or of] deception.”119 The war crime of prohibited perfidy, which is predicated on 
an act of treachery, offers another example of international law criminalizing deception, 
albeit under very narrow and particular circumstances.120
The foregoing examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. They demonstrate how deception 
operates as a legally operative harm with direct relevance to the principle of nonintervention. 
States can and should take account of these principles as legitimate subsidiary tools for 
elaborating the meaning of coercion in the context of nonintervention, better defining the 
scope of the rule, and adapting it to the realities of modern cyber and information conflict.
Calibrating the Pendulum
Applying these general principles to the element of coercion will better align the 
nonintervention rule with its underlying purpose and adapt it to the realities of the 
information age. As Sean Watts notes: “As States consider and weigh the merits and costs 
of various modes of interaction in the international system, charting options on this legal 
spectrum with some specificity becomes a prudent, if not always a simple exercise.”121 This 
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is notably true with respect to the increasingly complex dynamics of interstate relations in 
the cyber and information environments. States should leverage the nonintervention rule as 
a legitimate tool for deterring and regulating inimical action in these contexts.
Adopting the approach suggested here does not come without risk, however. Overbroad 
application of the rule would capture legitimate forms of statecraft and influence in its scope 
and raise collateral concerns regarding free expression that should be accounted for. States 
are rightfully unlikely to subscribe to a framework that sweeps too wide. Overt influence 
is a staple of international relations. It provides states an effective means of peacefully 
advancing their individual and collective interests on the world stage in a way that, even 
when aggressive, affords the targeted state the opportunity to contextualize and counter the 
influence in ways that covert deception campaigns are specifically intended to prevent. As 
Ohlin correctly asserts: “There must be a line between being coercive and being corrosive to 
the proper functioning of a democracy.”122 Clarifying how best to identify where that line 
falls is one thing. Blurring it further or erasing it altogether is another. Recognizing covert 
deception and disinformation campaigns as qualitatively and normatively distinct from 
overt influence, and as such a means of actual or constructive coercion, is a necessary step 
in drawing that line. However, additional limiting principles are warranted.
It is important to reemphasize at this point that to be wrongful, like any means or method 
of statecraft, covert deception must be intended “to influence outcomes in, or conduct 
with respect to, a matter reserved to a target State.”123 Clarifying or recasting the meaning 
of coercion would have no impact on defining the object of the rule’s protection—states’ 
domaine réservé. It would simply place the emphasis back on the ends that the principle 
of nonintervention is concerned with, with less dogmatic focus on the means employed. 
Ultimately, whatever means are employed, they “must have the potential for [actually or 
constructively] compelling the target State to engage in an action that it would otherwise 
not take (or refrain from taking an action that it would otherwise take).”124
Noting that coercion might fall along a broad spectrum from minimally invasive to 
“exceptionally aggressive” actions, any of which might or might not amount to intervention, 
Watts, borrowing from McDougal and Feliciano, proposes a test of “consequentiality” for 
determining wrongfulness.125 This test would consider “three dimensions of consequentiality,” 
including “the importance and number of values affected, the extent to which such values are 
affected, and the number of participants whose values are so affected.”126 Under this approach, 
he suggests consideration of the scale of an operation, the effects it produces in the target 
state, and its reach in terms of actors involuntarily affected.127
There is merit to Watts’s approach, perhaps with slight modification and clarification. First, as 
is often the case, it presupposes a consummated intervention. For the rule to have any true 
force and effect, it needs to operate prophylactically—both as a deterrent and potentially as 
a justification for measures intended to thwart an actual or anticipated intervention before 
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it works its harm. Responding to an intervention after the fact is suboptimal, because it may 
be too late at that point to prevent harm. Thus, the consequentiality test, or any other, must 
consider potential, not actual, harm.128
Second, the number of participants whose values are affected is not a particularly helpful 
dimension. It is just one measure of the extent to which sovereign values are affected and 
is a highly dependent variable. This is apparent in the case of election interference through 
covert deception, where the populace, or subsets thereof, are the primary targets of an 
operation or campaign, and swaying or dissuading votes or generally causing distrust in 
the results is the aim. In general terms, the degree to which the sovereign value of a free 
and fair election will be affected will likely be a function of the number of voters deceived. 
One can imagine how the viral spread of false reports of a candidate’s withdrawal from a 
closely contested race on the eve of an election could swing the results. On the other hand, 
where such close margins are at play, it might only require a handful of voters to alter the 
outcome. In either case, the consequence is the same.
Thus, consequentiality, or perhaps better stated, potential impact, is better understood as 
an assessment of the inverse relationship between the relative value of the targeted interest 
and the anticipated extent to which the interest will be affected. Even among the bundle 
of rights falling within the domaine réservé, there are necessarily qualitative differences. 
As evidenced by recent state pronouncements, independence over the choice of a state’s 
political system, that is, election processes and results, is at the core of protected sovereign 
interests.129 For heavily weighted interests such as elections, there should be lower tolerance 
for interventions aimed at undermining their independence. In such cases, there should be 
a strong presumption that covert deception measures targeting the electorate and election 
processes constitute a prohibited intervention.
Some states have recently expressed a view that cyber operations intended to disrupt the 
fundamental operation of legislative bodies or that would destabilize financial systems 
would violate the nonintervention principle.130 It is for those states to assign the relative 
weight of these sovereign interests, and they must bear responsibility for those assessments.
Determining whether a covert disinformation campaign constitutes a prohibited 
intervention must also account for intent. As noted in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, actions that 
“have a de facto coercive effect must be distinguished from those in which a State intends to 
coerce de jure.”131 While discerning adversary intent is always a challenge, where a campaign 
of covert deception is involved, intent is perhaps most easily assessed based on the nature of 
the deception and the target or targets of the covert propaganda being spread. For example, 
it is apparent from the record that the objective of Russia’s disinformation campaign during 
the last several election cycles was at least to corrupt the process and alter the results. But 
Russia has not confined its disinformation efforts to disrupting elections. It is also evident 
from the nature of its deception operations that Russia has engaged in a broader, systematic 
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campaign to sow division throughout Western democracies, demoralize cultural values, and 
alter the populations’ perceptions of reality. These actions meet almost any definition of 
subversion, where intent is fairly apparent.132
Finally, assessing the potential consequentiality or impact of anticipated or ongoing 
interference should be done holistically, considering the full context of an action or set of 
actions and their potential impact on the affected state.133 Information is but one element 
of state power and is rarely employed in isolation. For example, analyses that attempt to 
disaggregate the conglomeration of actions Russia took to impact the 2016 presidential 
elections ignore context and miss the mark. Russia’s actions were synchronized over time 
and space and mutually supportive—exactly the types of composite acts that “defined in 
the aggregate” are internationally wrongful.134
Conclusion
The advent of the modern, digital information environment has introduced the phenomenon 
of cyber conflict and fundamentally recast the nature of information conflict. Taking cues 
from Russia’s covert influence efforts, China and other revisionist states are more actively 
stepping into the information conflict arena, and the United States’ national-security 
apparatus is rightfully taking note. The recognition of this emerging threat is beginning to 
drive the United States’ strategic orientation and efforts to better defend against hostile foreign 
influence campaigns. International law can and should play a role in these efforts.
The rise of hostile cyber operations and the resurgence and evolution of information conflict 
have placed renewed emphasis on the principle of nonintervention as a tool for regulating 
interstate relations in the gray zone below and outside of armed hostilities. This renewed 
emphasis on the rule has also highlighted its definitional weaknesses—flaws that limit its 
immediate value as a means for regulating cyber and information conflict and risk, casting 
it as an anachronism. Effective adaptation of the rule to account for the realities of cyber 
and information conflict will require states to establish greater clarity on the core concept 
of coercion and the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate nonforcible measures 
of influence and statecraft. This is difficult terrain, but states should start the process by 
refocusing on the central interest the nonintervention rule is intended to protect—sovereign 
equality and independence. Drawing a line between covert deception and overt influence is a 
sound starting point, consistent with general principles of law common to many domestic legal 
regimes that recognize and regulate deception as a legally cognizable harm in myriad ways.
A cornerstone of the rules-based international order, international law has played an 
important role in regulating interstate relations and achieving some semblance of stability 
and security in the post−World War II era—a proposition reflected in the United States’ 
long-standing commitment to the framework of international law and its contribution 
to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Any US strategy aimed at effectively addressing 
ICT-enabled national-security threats, including covert influence and deception campaigns, 
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should include the United States taking a lead on advancing the role of international law 
and norms development. Drawing more definitive lines with respect to the role of the 
rule of nonintervention will serve the dual purpose of deterring adversary states from 
crossing articulated red lines and, where deterrence fails or is ineffective, underpinning the 
legitimacy of US counter-cyber and counter-influence responses.
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